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ABSTRACT
Currently there are multiple ways of verifying the identity and integrity of Internet
of Things (IoT) sensors based on, for example, the Trusted Computing Group’s (TCG’s)
Guidance for Securing Network Equipment, software-centered approaches such as using a
checksum, and using an in-band and out-of-band approaches for integrity validation. In
each of these approaches, trustworthiness may be based on limited artifacts. As well, none
of these approaches employ quantum resistant secure key exchange methods between a
Long Range (LoRa) Wide Area Network (LoRa) (LoRaWAN) Gateway and sensors. To
address these challenges techniques are presented herein that apply an attestation method
to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), which is used between a LoRa Gateway
and sensors, to provide "proof of integrity" and "freshness of proof of integrity" (in other
words, trustworthiness) to IoT sensor devices. An Attestation ID that is derived through an
attestation method is shared in data traffic (i.e., in-band) securely using a Post-Quantum
Cryptography (PQC) method.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
IoT consists of ‘things’ (e.g., sensors) that are enabled with some form of compute,
network, and storage capability which, in turn, makes them subject to attack or
modification by malicious parties. Hence there needs to be a way to perform investigation
and cyber security forensics to gather and preserve attack evidence from a particular IoT
computing device to check if it has been compromised.
Currently there are multiple ways of verifying the identity (e.g., using manufacturer
usage descriptions (MUD)) and the integrity of IoT sensors, based either on the TCG’s
Guidance for Securing Network Equipment (e.g., Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
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v1/TPM

v2,

see

https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/tcg-guidance-securing-

networkequipment/) or on software-based approaches such as using a checksum (see, for
example, “Software-Based Remote Code Attestation in Wireless Sensor Network” under
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5425280). As well, there are mechanisms which
employ an out-of-band approach for integrity validation and mechanisms which employ an
in-band approach for integrity validation.
In each of these approaches, determining the trustworthiness of an IoT sensor by
validating the proof of integrity, freshness of the proof of integrity, canary Stamps,
Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) values, measurement lists, etc. is not considered.
Additionally, under certain in-band approaches to integrity validation, an encrypted
Attestation ID that is shared between a sensor and a fog router is not quantum resistant and
thus prone to cryptanalysis attacks using Shor's and Grover's algorithm (as will be further
described below).
To address these challenges, techniques are presented herein that support use of an
attestation method for providing trustworthiness to IoT sensors and use of a Post-Quantum
Pre-Shared Key (PQPSK) for encrypting an Attestation ID which is sent in-band with the
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) packets for doing a first level of validation at the
fog/edge router and attestation verification at the LoRa Gateway.
Various of the techniques that are presented herein leverage aspects of four
foundational technologies.

In support of the upcoming detailed discussion of the

techniques that are presented herein, each of those four foundational technologies are
briefly introduced below.
1. Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). CoAP is a User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) based protocol having request and response based messaging semantics. See, for
example, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request For Comments (RFC) 7252
(“The Constrained Application Protocol” under https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7252), RFC
7959 (“Block-Wise Transfers in the Constrained Application Protocol” under
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7959), and RFC 8613 (“Object Security for Constrained
RESTful Environments (OSCORE)” under https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8613).
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2. LoRa Wireless Area Network (LoRa WAN) with IPv6. The transmission of IPv6
Packets over LoRaWAN is defined by the IETF in “Transmission of IPv6 Packets over
LoRaWAN” (under https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-vilajosana-lpwan-lora-hc-00.txt).
3. Cryptanalysis attacks and quantum resistant algorithms.

For public-key

encryption the algorithms that are currently employed are based on Rivest–Shamir–
Adleman (RSA) public-key cryptosystems or elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) and will
be broken by quantum computers using, for example, Shor's algorithm, Grover's algorithm,
etc.
Code-based cryptography (e.g., McEliece) has been studied since 1978 and has
withstood attacks very well, including attacks using quantum computers.
For example, McEliece with binary Goppa codes using length n = 6960, dimension
k

=

5413

and

adding

t

=

https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1180.pdf).

119

errors

is

thought

to

be

safe

(see

However, this method is not commonly used

because of the compute power needed to generate keys and their sheer size (as well,
rekeying McEliece is too expensive).
The Stehle-Steinfeld version of the N-th degree Truncated polynomial Ring Units
(NTRU) lattice-based crypto system is also believed to be quantum resistant (see
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f372/3b29d42e1e6b5869b478677761ff0a69860c.pdf).
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a way to distribute commonly shared secrets
which can be leveraged to derive the same Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key on
both sides. But QKD requires additional bandwidth (e.g., dedicated fiber) and a limitation
on the distance (e.g., approximately 100KM). Furthermore, it is not suited for large scale
enterprise deployments with numerous sites/locations.
4. Attestation and PQC methods.. Attestation is a trusted computing technology
which may be applied to the instant problem class. TPM functionality is now embedded
in a wide variety of devices including mobile phones, PCs, and routers. Attestation as
defined by the TCG describes how the TPM may be used as a hardware root of trust and
offer proof of integrity of a node. PQC methods are discussed below.
Turning to the techniques that are presented herein, a known fog-based attestation
approach considers a number of flows but has various limitations. More particularly:

3
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020

6555
4

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 3692 [2020]



A checksum value is calculated based on the program memory space and used
as an Attestation ID (e.g., hash ID) and shared with the server (e.g., LoRa)
during initial attestation verification. The server then downloads the attestation
ID of sensors to a fog router (e.g., a IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal
Area Network (6LoWPAN) Border Router (6LBR)) to store it in the local
database.
o Limitation: Integrity validation of IoT sensors by a server (e.g., LoRa)
using a checksum value is based on the program memory space, but no
mention is made of attestation methods such as a canary stamp or a
hardware fingerprint stored securely in Aikido/Anti-Counterfeit
Technology (ACT2)/Trust Anchor module (TAM) chip which is tamper
proof.



Data packets from the sensor carry an Attestation ID in the IPv6 extension
header (EH) to a fog router. For avoiding man-in-the-middle and replay attacks,
it uses an encryption key which is periodically (e.g., based on time or based on
number of packets) exchanged in control frames between a fog router and a
sensor to encrypt the Attestation ID/hash ID which is sent in a IPv6 EH from a
sensor to a fog router.
o Limitations:


Keeping the encryption key in-sync across fog routers is
challenging and requires use of some protocol to accomplish.



An encryption key is exchanged in control packets and hence
should be sent over some secure tunnel or it should be conveyed
using public-key cryptography (no mention is made of this) for
sharing the secret. The secure tunnel establishment itself should
also be based on a pre-shared key or certificate-based
authentication. Pre-shared key configuration on all of the
sensors and on all of the fog routers is not feasible (especially
with scale) and thus motivates the use of Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) methods. But the use of public-key
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cryptographic methods are prone to cryptanalysis attacks as
described previously.


A fog router uses an Attestation ID/hash ID to verify the locally stored
information. Any change in program memory on a sensor will result in a
different hashing and hence a different Attestation ID in an IPv6 EH which can
be detected by a fog router.
o Limitation: Just a checksum value is considered, as opposed to other
information such as Known Good Values (KGV) including, for example,
a microloader measurement list (ML), a Basic Input/Output System
(BIOS) measurement list (BL), runtime functionality, working
condition and validation of sensors, etc.



Upon detecting an anomaly, a fog router may trigger the attestation verification
request to a server (e.g., LoRa) and, in turn, the server initiates attestation
verification with the sensor.

Under aspects of the techniques that are presented herein, instead of relaying only
on a checksum value an attestation method for validating trustworthiness may be employed
using the following information elements to generate an Attestation ID/hash ID:


A hardware fingerprint for "device identity."



Measurement lists (for a microloader, BIOS, libraries, applications - in short,
KGV) and PCR values for "proof of integrity."



A canary stamp, nonce, or timestamp for "freshness of proof of integrity."

In brief, the techniques that are presented herein provide trustworthiness to the
sensors. Under other aspects of the techniques that are presented herein, instead of
encrypting an Attestation ID/hash ID with the encryption key shared by the fog router over
control packets (it should be shared over a secure tunnel or using a PKI), since it is known
that PKI methods are prone to cryptanalysis attacks by Shor's and Grover's algorithm a
post-quantum secure key exchange mechanism using a PQC method may be employed, as
illustrated in Figure 1, below.
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Figure 1: Exemplary Environment
PQC is critical for IoT security in a quantum era. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) is working to come up with PQC standards for Third
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Fifth Generation (5G) environments and the same
is

applicable

for

low-power

IoT

(as

mentioned

in

https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=927805).
NIST is designing a PQC algorithm as a "drop-in replacement" for RSA public-key
cryptosystems and ECC, but there are many challenges with respect to public key size,
signature size, alternative auxiliary functions, certificate authority (CA) infrastructure, etc.
Candidates for a PQC algorithm include lattice-based, coding-based, multivariate, stateless
hash-based signatures, and super singular elliptic curve isogeny-based approaches.
Out of these methods, NIST is planning to standardize stateful hash based
signatures based on standards developed by the IETF. After further analysis and evaluation
of the above methods, NIST is planning to release draft standards for public comments in
2022 or 2023.
Until the standardized PQC methods are in-place for IoT alternate approaches to
the above described challenges are needed in support of, for example, different

6
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3692

6555
7

M and Kenchaiah: SECURE AND OPTIMIZED METHOD OF PROVIDING TRUSTWORTHINESS FOR IOT

environments such as low-power IoT devices in smart city deployments, IoT sensors in
low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) deployments, etc.
For generating quantum resistant keys (aka PQPSK) a PQC method may be
employed. However, there are other methods, such as QKD, that may be used as a
replacement for a PQC method for providing quantum security to IoT/sensor deployments.
Under aspects of the techniques that are presented herein an attestation method is
applied to a CoAP which is used between a LoRa Gateway and sensors to provide "proof
of integrity" and "freshness of proof of integrity" (in other words, trustworthiness) to IoT
sensor devices. An Attestation ID that is derived during the attestation method is securely
shared in data traffic (i.e., in-band) using a post-quantum secure method (e.g., a PQC
method).
Elements of particular interest and note within the techniques that are presented
herein are discussed below.
A first element of the techniques presented herein comprises an attestation method
to provide trustworthiness to sensors. CoAP runs over UDP, wherein CoAP request and
response semantics are carried in CoAP messages which include either a Method Code or
Response Code, respectively. Optional request and response information, such as the
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) and payload media type, are carried as CoAP options.
Aspects of a first element of the techniques that are presented herein add attestation
information to the CoAP request and response packets as an extension that embeds:


A hardware finger print (e.g., derived from a Secure Unique Device Identifier
(SUDI) or similar value).



Software (e.g., KGV such as operating system (OS), BIOS, kernel, version,
application binaries/libraries, etc.).



A canary stamp (e.g., counters, time-ticks, PCR values, etc.).



An Attestation ID that is generated by hashing the above information.

A first sub-element to the first element of the techniques presented herein comprises
proof of integrity. In particular, TPM functionality is used as a root of trust and as a proof
of integrity of sensors.
As mentioned in RFC 7252 (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7252#section-5,
“Request/Response Semantics”), CoAP provides support for carrying a number of options.
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These options are used as additions to the protocol without breaking backward
compatibility with earlier versions. Aspects of the techniques presented herein add
attestation information as another option to be carried in request/response (CoAP) packets
to provide proof of integrity.
A second sub-element to the first element of the techniques presented herein
comprises freshness of the proof of integrity. Proof of integrity can also be accompanied
with a signature to prove freshness of the proof of integrity – i.e., by adding a signature
over a random nonce (aka entropy) presented by the LoRa Gateway to the sensor in the
CoAP packet. This would help in detecting the replay of old evidence via a "nonce." A
"nonce" is a random number provided by the LoRa Gateway making the request. Such a
nonce is passed into the TPM. The results coming out of the TPM include a signature
based on the nonce. That result is the output from the TPM which could not have been
generated before that nonce was provided.
Consider an example as follows, and as illustrated via Figure 2, below:


If a CoAP packet from the LoRa Gateway contains random data/nonce it is
extended to carry an intention to validate proof of integrity.



A CoAP packet from the sensor carries an extension to its proof of integrity
along with a signature over random data/nonce received in CoAP packet from
the LoRa Gateway.



A LoRa Gateway and a sensor participating in a CoAP protocol exchange will
use this attestation information to verify whether the sensor is trustworthy or
not to make a decision to consider as a trusted sensor.
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Figure 2: CoAP Protocol Extensions
A third sub-element to the first element of the techniques presented herein
comprises in-band validation using an Attestation ID. Once a sensor is considered to be
trusted, an Attestation ID shared by the sensors during attestation verification is
downloaded to the fog routers (e.g., a 6LBR) which will be used to validate the Attestation
ID sent by the sensor in the IPv6 EH data packets (to be further explained in a "How it
Works" narrative below). To avoid man-in-the-middle and replay attacks (i.e., malicious
activity), an Attestation ID will be encrypted using a PQPSK which is shared using a postquantum secure key exchange method (as explained in the following paragraphs).
A second element of the techniques presented herein comprises a PQPSK
generation and sharing mechanism using a PQC method. The CoAP may be extended to
allow the LoRa Gateway (e.g., a server) to distribute a post-quantum identifier (e.g., a
PQPSK ID) to various sensors. Here, the LoRa Gateway (i.e., the server) acts as key server
and a sensor acts as non-key server.
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Subsequently, the LoRa Gateway (i.e., server) and a Sensor will use the negotiated
PQPSK ID to get the same PQPSK key from a PQC method, also referred to as the
Quantum Key Source (QKS), which will be used as an encryption key for encrypting the
Attestation ID in the IPv6 packet as an EH in the data traffic (i.e., in-band data packet).
PQC requires the initial seed secret key to be installed on each of the PQC key
provider devices so that the PQC method generates a unique PQPSK Key from the PQPSK
ID (i.e., a unique {PQPSK Key, PQPSK ID} pair). Management of the initial seed key is
presented below in the description of a third sub-element to this (i.e., second) element of
the techniques presented herein (i.e., describing a secret seed value being shared between
a LoRa Gateway and a sensor).
To avoid a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on a PQPSK ID, a Key Server (KS)
should include some authentication information along with the PQPSK ID generated by
the PQC method. For example:


A signature is signed on a PQPSK ID by the KS using a private key (e.g.,
securely stored through a SUDI/ACT2/TAM chip which is tamper proof).



A PQC method on the KS generates a {PQPSK Key, PQPSK ID} pair which is
unique per device.



The KS may generate a signature by signing on a PQPSK ID using its private
key and include that signature also as part of a PQPSK ID type-length-value
(TLV).



The consolidated PQPSK ID TLV is shared to a peer.



The peer validates the signature using the public key of the KS before accepting
the PQPSK ID sent by the KS.



A set of PQPSK TLVs are introduced to provide post-quantum security.
o PQPSK Capability TLV - For exchanging PQPSK capabilities to
identify the ability for post-quantum security.
o PQPSK ID Information TLV - For sending a PQPSK ID from the LoRa
Gateway (a KS) to the sensor (a non-key server)

A first sub-element to the second element of the techniques presented herein
comprises a PQPSK Capability TLV (exchanged between a sensor and a LoRa Gateway).
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IoT sensors which support a post-quantum pre-shared key (a PQPSK) announce
that capability as part of a PQPSK capability TLV in a CoAP Request message (see
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7252#section-5). An example of one possible PQPSK
Capabilities TLV is presented in Figure 3, below.

Figure 3: PQPSK Capabilities TLV
If IoT sensors are not capable of PQPSK then they may fall back to a legacy means
of encrypting the Attestation ID.
A second sub-element to the second element of the techniques presented herein
comprises distribution of a PQPSK ID information TLV (comprising, for example a type,
a signature, a PQPSK ID, a checksum, etc.) between a LoRa Gateway and a sensor. When
both a LoRa Gateway and a sensor are PQPSK capable, the LoRa Gateway (a KS)
generates the PQPSK ID with the help of a local PQC service and distributes same to the
sensor

in

a

PQPSK

ID

TLV

in

a

CoAP

Response

message

(see

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7252#section-5)
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An example of one possible PQPSK ID information TLV is presented in Figure 4,
below.

Figure 4: PQPSK ID Information TLV
The second element of the techniques presented herein includes a first phase
(Phase-1) of the PQC process – sharing a secret seed value between a LoRa Gateway and
a sensor. Various of the activities that may occur during Phase-1 are described below.
As part of the manufacturing process, private and public keys are generated on a
LoRa Gateway (e.g., a server) and a sensor using a quantum secure algorithm such as
McEliece. Note that this is a one-time process.
Under a TPM or virtual TPM (vTPM) scenario a manufacturing team generates
private and public keys using the same root CA (e.g., through a PKI). The generated keys
are stored in a SUDI/ACT2/TAM chip on a LoRa Gateway (a KS) and a sensor (a non-key
server). The public keys (with root CA certificate chain) are bundled as part of the image.
Under a third-party support scenario McEliece public keys can also be exchanged
between peers, over an out-of-band secure connection, to support third-party certificates.

12
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3692

6555
13

M and Kenchaiah: SECURE AND OPTIMIZED METHOD OF PROVIDING TRUSTWORTHINESS FOR IOT

The private and public key of a LoRa Gateway and a sensor may, to aid exposition,
be referred to as SK1 and PK1 for the LoRa Gateway and SK2 and PK2 for the sensor. As
well, the LoRa Gateway acts as KS.
A HMAC Key Derivation Function (HKDF) may be employed to generate a unique
"secret seed value" on the LoRa Gateway. The generated "secret seed value" may be
encrypted with the public key PK2 of the sensor to generate a ciphertext. The ciphertext is
then sent to the sensor. The sensor may decrypt the ciphertext using its private key SK2 to
recover the "secret seed value." Now both the LoRa Gateway and the sensor have a
common "secret seed," which may be used by a PQC method in phase two of the PQC
process (as described below in connection with a fourth sub-element to the second element
of the techniques presented herein).
Similarly, the same secret seed value is exchanged between a LoRa Gateway and a
fog/edge router so that a fog/edge router can generate the same PQPSK key from the
PQPSK ID of the sensor. Note that the PQPSK ID that is populated in phase two of the
PQC process, as described below, is downloaded along with a per-sensor Attestation ID to
a fog router by the LoRa Gateway.
Figure 5, below, illustrates aspects of common secret seed establishment using the
McEliece algorithm.
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Figure 5: Common Secret Seed Establishment
The second element of the techniques presented herein further includes a second
phase (Phase-2) of the PQC process – generation of the same pre-shared key using a PQC
method. Various of the activities that may occur during Phase-2 are described below.
The LoRa Gateway and the sensor use a service which will generate a unique
{PQPSK Key, PQPSK ID} pair based on the common secret seed exchanged in phase one
(as described above). This service may be called a PQC process, which is a software entity
implemented inside the LoRa Gateway/fog router/sensors.
The LoRa Gateway and the sensor initialize their local PQC instance with the
common secret seed that was exchanged in phase one (as described above). The LoRa
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Gateway (KS) requests its local PQC instance to generate a PQPSK secret key (which is
unique to each sensor) and the PQC generates the secret key PQPSK key.
A unique identity PQPSK ID is paired with each generated PQPSK key. The LoRa
Gateway receives the PQPSK key and the corresponding unique identity PQPSK ID from
the local PQC instance. The LoRa Gateway then sends the identity PQPSK ID
corresponding to the PQPSK key to the sensor. It is important to note that the PQPSK key
itself is never exchanged between the LoRa Gateway and the sensor.
The sensor requests its local PQC instance to fetch the PQPSK Key corresponding
to the PQPSK ID that was received from the LoRa Gateway. Since the PQC instances of
the LoRa Gateway and the sensor have with the same seed secret, they will have the same
PQPSK key corresponding to the PQPSK ID. Now, the LoRa Gateway and the sensor will
have the same PQPSK Key which they can use as an encryption key for encrypting an
Attestation ID in the IPv6 EH packet. Optionally, sensors can use the PQPSK key as a
post-quantum symmetric key to provide data confidentiality (e.g., encryption/decryption
of data traffic).
Any time that a LoRa Gateway wishes to refresh the encryption key the LoRa
Gateway and the sensor may run the above procedure. Hence, a LoRa Gateway and a
sensor can refresh their keys at will, without any administrative intervention and without
ever exhausting their shared keys (since they are generated once). A PQPSK ID populated
for each sensor is downloaded along with a per-sensor Attestation ID to a fog router by the
LoRa Gateway. Figure 6, below, depicts aspects of a post-quantum secure connection
establishment using PQC.
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Figure 6: Post-Quantum Key Exchange
Various of the techniques presented herein offer a number of benefits, including:


Since IoT devices (e.g., IoT sensors, industrial IoT devices, etc.) are prone to
several attacks and vulnerabilities, providing trusted IoT deployments in an
optimized way by triggering the validation of integrity only whenever an
edge/fog devices detect anomaly with the IoT sensors.



Contributing to providing trusted LoRaWAN deployments.



Leveraging PQC for providing quantum resistant method to share encryption
keys for encrypting attestation information (e.g., Attestation ID/hash ID).
Sensors can use a PQPSK key as a post quantum symmetric key to provide data
confidentiality (encryption/decryption of data traffic).

Aspects of the techniques presented herein may be further understood through the
following “How it Works” overall flow narrative:
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https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3692

6555
17

M and Kenchaiah: SECURE AND OPTIMIZED METHOD OF PROVIDING TRUSTWORTHINESS FOR IOT

1. In the LoRaWAN gateway topology, a LoRa Gateway uses a CoAP-based
attestation method to validate the trustworthiness of the IoT Sensor (as explained above in
the description of a first element of the techniques presented herein – an attestation method
to provide trustworthiness to sensors). As part of that process, an Attestation ID/hash ID
is generated and exchanged between the IoT sensor and the LoRa Gateway.
2. The Attestation ID/hash ID will be downloaded to the border nodes (e.g., fog
routers, 6LBR, etc.) from the LoRa Gateway using a CoAP extension.
3. The data offload is done selectively so that information that is relevant just to the
set of personal area network (PAN) (e.g., a mesh ID) is downloaded to the fog/edge routers.
4. The above can be further downloaded from the 6LBR to a 6LoWPAN Router
(6LR) depending on the node capability.
5. Any sensor which forwards data to a remote sensor or cloud outside of the fog
network will include the Attestation ID in the IPv6 EH of the data traffic.
6. In support of scale (e.g., volume), different options may be enabled. One such
option may indicate when to include the Attestation ID in the IPv6 EH – e.g., on all packets
sent from the sensor, selectively on different packets to reduce the bandwidth and power
consumption, or an on demand request (using, for example, an IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation
(NS) extension) from a fog/edge router to a sensor. See, for example, Figure 7, below.

Figure 7: Attestation ID Inclusion in an IPv6 EH
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7. Since an IPv6 EH is used as the mechanism to carry the attestation information
(Attestation ID/hash ID) man-in-the-middle and replay attacks are quite possible in which
the malicious activity in the network can snoop on the EH to retrieve the Attestation ID
with malware itself being inserted into the sensor to replay the Attestation ID to remain
undetected. To avoid such a situation, the Attestation ID computed should be based on the
PQPSK key generated using a quantum resistant method such as a PQC method (as
explained above in the description of a second element of the techniques presented herein
– a PQPSK generation and sharing mechanism using a PQC method). A PQC method is
one way to generate and share quantum resistant keys, but any of the quantum resistant
methods (as described above) may be incorporated.
8. In any of the cases, if the sensor device is compromised (e.g., if malicious code
is downloaded to the sensor) falsified data may flow through the IoT deployment and/or
the functionality of other sensors may be impacted. By employing aspects of the techniques
presented herein the Attestation ID/hash ID will change resulting in a mismatch between
the value received in an IPv6 data packet (i.e., an EH) and the cached value in fog/edge
routers (i.e., nodes). See, for example, Figure 8, below.
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Figure 8: Attestation ID Mismatch
9. If an edge/fog router detects any such anomaly it will trigger the LoRA Gateway
(i.e., a server) to initiate validation of the "proof of integrity" and "freshness of proof of
integrity". Until the sensor validity verification is confirmed by the LoRa Gateway, none
of the traffic from the sensor will be forwarded to any other IoT devices (i.e., nodes) and it
will be dropped by the 6LR/6LBR (as described above in connection with a first element
of the techniques presented herein).
As described above, aspects of the techniques presented herein support a scalable
solution that, possibly among other things, integrates integrity validation (using an
attestation method) in-line with data traffic using a quantum resistant method and detects
any compromised sensors quickly to avoid falsified data or a negative impact on other
sensors.
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In summary, techniques have been presented hat apply an attestation method to the
CoAP, which is employed between a LoRa Gateway and sensors, to provide "Proof of
Integrity" and "Freshness of Proof of Integrity" (in other words, trustworthiness) to IoT
sensor devices. As well, an Attestation ID that is derived during an attestation method is
shared in data traffic (i.e., in-band) securely using a post-quantum secure method such as
a PQC method.
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